Determinism Misunderstood

While searching for a specific blog post written by Sam Harris, I stumbled across a blog posting at Simple Apologetics (my first visit) that critiqued Harris’ views on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility. Normally  I would not bother responding to a blog to which I am not a regular reader or subscriber, except for the fact that so much of its content embodies some of the most common (and fundamental) misunderstandings regarding determinism and its implications. I believe it is misunderstandings such as these that contribute to an overall confusion regarding the realities of a deterministic worldview and a mischaracterization of those who affirm this worldview. To that end, I should like to offer responses to the five criticisms the author levels against determinism and its implications at large. Hopefully this will paint a clearer picture of what determinism is not.

(1) Affirming determinism requires that one affirm the fixity of all aspects of the universe, and so this results in an absurdity wherein determinists appear to endeavor to change their circumstances (or in this case, Sam Harris endeavors to persuade others of his position) even though the universe is allegedly fixed.

I would say that (1) is far and away the most widely spread and tragically sophomoric reading of determinism among laypersons. Though the author claims it is a minor point,  it factors quite heavily into understanding determinist theory. To quote the author,

Sam Harris says that he cannot change his own mind. He also says that no one else has the free will to change their minds. So why does he go to such great lengths to change our minds? On the one hand, he says that no one can change their minds, but on the other, he acts as if people could choose to change their minds. This is a subtle indication that it is impossible to really live as if determinism is true.

Those who follow this line of reasoning conflate the fixity of the universe with a coercive and confusingly noncausal view of the universe. So, the author believes that if minds cannot be changed, and the universe is fixed, then Sam Harris or any other determinist is not warranted in continuing to act in ways that seek to change his environment. This view fails to factor in a fundamental and necessary element of determinism, viz. that the state of the universe at any given moment contributes to the state of the universe in the very next moment by way of a set of causal relationships. So, simply because Sam Harris cannot alter his physiology or change his mind in some way required by an agent-causal system does not mean he cannot participate in the causal chains which might results in another person being persuaded by a certain argument, etc. To claim that the state of the universe at any given moment is fixed regardless of the behavior of the objects which populate it would be a noncausal view of the universe, since the objects in that universe seemingly maintain no causal relationship with one another.

On a broader scale, the author also misunderstands what Harris and other determinists mean when they say that a person cannot change her mind. So, when I say that my choice between apple pie and pumpkin pie is determined, what I mean to say is that whatever choice I end up making is the choice I was going to make, ceteris paribus. Had a detail of the universe prior to that moment been other than it was, my decision might have been different. This in no ways means that I do not feel as though I deliberate at the moment of decision, or that I cannot decide I want apple pie but change my mind when I get to the counter – all it means is that, by virtue of the very nature of causality, I cannot ever act in a manner other than how I would act if the state of the universe remained the same. Had the state of the universe been different, I might have decided differently, since the causal chain leading up to my decision was altered. I will leave it up for debate as to whether a determinist can, in good faith, claim that this universe is not the only possible set of outcomes.

(2) Determinative factors, whether neurological or societal, are coercive to the point that if one affirms neurological determinism, one must also grant that one’s political situation, oppressed or ‘free’, matters very little, since one already lacks freedom of the will.

This approach conflates determinative elements with coercive elements. It can very easily be the case that I could not have done other than I have done, but that I am not being physically or emotionally coerced. So, if I act in accordance with my biology and psychology, despite my actions and choices being determined, I have not been ‘coerced’, since I may seemingly act according to my desires, etc. However, if I am in a political climate wherein my behavior is curtailed or I am abused, this is a coercive restriction and not just a determinative one.  So while in instances of neurological determinism I can act in a determined way and still do so in accordance with my drives and motivations, a coercive political structure would prevent me from acting in accordance with those desires and drives. To digress for a moment, state coercion is not necessarily a negative element (keep reading, Libertarians!) since most would agree that it might be reasonable for the state to use coercion in order to prevent pedophiles and rapists from enacting their drives and desires, though this is a discussion for another time.

In addition to the above point, there is also the very reasonable argument that regardless of metaphysical freedom, it is still preferrable for citizens to have a peaceful and participatory relationship with their government. I fail to see how, given the distinction between coercion and determination, this could be argued against.

(3) If our persons and our decisions are all determined, then it is pointless to attempt to change anything at all, including the behavior of others. Thus, we have no option but to despair if we adopt a deterministic outlook.

A variation on (1), this argument also fails to factor in the causal role our decisions play regardless of if they are determined or not. It also conflates, as (1) does, the fixity of the universe with the meaninglessness of attempting to alter the world around us. The way this argument is phrased makes it appear the author means that, regardless of if I choose A or B, the outcome will still be C, though I suspect what the author truly means is that regardless of what I do, I am destined to choose B and thus stuck with the outcome of C. With this knowledge, how can I help but be depressed?

Again, though, the author fails to account for the fact that, except in instances of coercion, even if our actions are determined they are still our actions. If I decide to purchase a turkey sandwich instead of a ham sandwich, just because I would not have purchases a ham sandwich unless the situation had somehow differed, why should I despair? The choice is still in accordance with my preferences, and I am not being made to act other than I wish to act – all the author seems to be concerned about is an unrealistic standard for agent-causal freedom that allows persons to remain unswayed by any factors and yet still make decisions and cause events. As may be clear from some of my previous posts, I disagree strongly with this ‘requirement’ for meaning.

(4) If moral responsibility requires that a decision be made under a person’s own power in order for her to be responsible for it, and determinism concludes that no choice she makes is ever up to her, then all talk of morality is pointless.

Here it might be convenient to quote the author in order to see what is going on:

Once Sam Harris denies that we are “answerable or accountable, as for something within one’s own power, control, or management,” which is a standard definition (e.g., dictionary.reference.com) for “responsibility,” then any talk of “morality” does become empty and hollow. Again, his view is that human actionsare determined by “neuronal weather.” So none of our actions or thoughts are under our control. Therefore, it still makes good sense to say that Sam Harris’s position means that all talk about morality is completely illusory.

First, it is slightly problematic to use the definition provided here, since it concerns power and control. I do not believe many determinists would deny that, at any given moment (unless we are being coerced or there are other mitigating factors), most persons are under control of their behavior in that most actions are in accordance with a thought process and are rationalized (even if only after the fact.) A better approach would be to use the Principle of Alternate Possibility, which states that I am only morally responsible for my actions if I could have done otherwise. This, of course, condemns determinism to a lack of moral responsibility since I can seemingly never do other than I could do. I am, of course, sympathetic to this approach, given that elsewhere I discuss how I do not believe Harry Frankfurt’s revised PAP quite does the job required of it. I am not sure of how I feel about moral responsibility versus moral judgement, though the article linked to in the last sentence gives an introduction to my thoughts about it thus far. So, other than the example, (4) is relatively innocuous.

(5) Sam Harris relegates moral responsibility to being capable of being held accountable for those actions in accordance with my desires, feelings, etc. But since none of these are under my control, how can I be held accountable for them? Also, this view seems to run contrary to the common view of responsibility, etc.

In this point, the author once again reiterates that if determinism is true, none of our thoughts or feelings are under our control, which I discuss above as not necessarily being the case. That being said, I would challenge anyone reading to consider how exactly they experience the onset of a thought, or remembering some event or fact. I think those who believe we control our every thought and desire will be surprised when they consider that, if I cannot remember a certain person’s name, I am incapable of remembering it until my brain accesses that portion of my memory. You cannot force yourself to remember someone’s name – it either comes to you instantly, or it comes to you later, or never. Similarly, I never choose to have the desire for pizza – I simply have  the desire to eat pizza and then choose to satiate it or not. This is an important distinction, because it points to what I believe is an antiquated view of persons as passengers in the body, capable of controlling nearly every element but somehow existing as something more than the physiological parts. This view is not in keeping with modern advances in neuroscience, nor is it a particularly easy  metaphysical approach to defend.

I mean no disrespect to the author of the post to which I am replying. However, I do think it exemplifies a number of misconceptions that ultimately contribute to an unfair rejection of determinism. While the author and others may yet still disagree with the points listed here, I hope that my responses can shed some light on the true nature of a deterministic worldview so that it may be properly considered.

**2/4/12: Updated the hyperlink above to reflect the new domain, www.reasonsforgod.org**