Determinism Misunderstood

While searching for a specific blog post written by Sam Harris, I stumbled across a blog posting at Simple Apologetics (my first visit) that critiqued Harris’ views on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility. Normally  I would not bother responding to a blog to which I am not a regular reader or subscriber, except for the fact that so much of its content embodies some of the most common (and fundamental) misunderstandings regarding determinism and its implications. I believe it is misunderstandings such as these that contribute to an overall confusion regarding the realities of a deterministic worldview and a mischaracterization of those who affirm this worldview. To that end, I should like to offer responses to the five criticisms the author levels against determinism and its implications at large. Hopefully this will paint a clearer picture of what determinism is not.

(1) Affirming determinism requires that one affirm the fixity of all aspects of the universe, and so this results in an absurdity wherein determinists appear to endeavor to change their circumstances (or in this case, Sam Harris endeavors to persuade others of his position) even though the universe is allegedly fixed.

I would say that (1) is far and away the most widely spread and tragically sophomoric reading of determinism among laypersons. Though the author claims it is a minor point,  it factors quite heavily into understanding determinist theory. To quote the author,

Sam Harris says that he cannot change his own mind. He also says that no one else has the free will to change their minds. So why does he go to such great lengths to change our minds? On the one hand, he says that no one can change their minds, but on the other, he acts as if people could choose to change their minds. This is a subtle indication that it is impossible to really live as if determinism is true.

Those who follow this line of reasoning conflate the fixity of the universe with a coercive and confusingly noncausal view of the universe. So, the author believes that if minds cannot be changed, and the universe is fixed, then Sam Harris or any other determinist is not warranted in continuing to act in ways that seek to change his environment. This view fails to factor in a fundamental and necessary element of determinism, viz. that the state of the universe at any given moment contributes to the state of the universe in the very next moment by way of a set of causal relationships. So, simply because Sam Harris cannot alter his physiology or change his mind in some way required by an agent-causal system does not mean he cannot participate in the causal chains which might results in another person being persuaded by a certain argument, etc. To claim that the state of the universe at any given moment is fixed regardless of the behavior of the objects which populate it would be a noncausal view of the universe, since the objects in that universe seemingly maintain no causal relationship with one another.

On a broader scale, the author also misunderstands what Harris and other determinists mean when they say that a person cannot change her mind. So, when I say that my choice between apple pie and pumpkin pie is determined, what I mean to say is that whatever choice I end up making is the choice I was going to make, ceteris paribus. Had a detail of the universe prior to that moment been other than it was, my decision might have been different. This in no ways means that I do not feel as though I deliberate at the moment of decision, or that I cannot decide I want apple pie but change my mind when I get to the counter – all it means is that, by virtue of the very nature of causality, I cannot ever act in a manner other than how I would act if the state of the universe remained the same. Had the state of the universe been different, I might have decided differently, since the causal chain leading up to my decision was altered. I will leave it up for debate as to whether a determinist can, in good faith, claim that this universe is not the only possible set of outcomes.

(2) Determinative factors, whether neurological or societal, are coercive to the point that if one affirms neurological determinism, one must also grant that one’s political situation, oppressed or ‘free’, matters very little, since one already lacks freedom of the will.

This approach conflates determinative elements with coercive elements. It can very easily be the case that I could not have done other than I have done, but that I am not being physically or emotionally coerced. So, if I act in accordance with my biology and psychology, despite my actions and choices being determined, I have not been ‘coerced’, since I may seemingly act according to my desires, etc. However, if I am in a political climate wherein my behavior is curtailed or I am abused, this is a coercive restriction and not just a determinative one.  So while in instances of neurological determinism I can act in a determined way and still do so in accordance with my drives and motivations, a coercive political structure would prevent me from acting in accordance with those desires and drives. To digress for a moment, state coercion is not necessarily a negative element (keep reading, Libertarians!) since most would agree that it might be reasonable for the state to use coercion in order to prevent pedophiles and rapists from enacting their drives and desires, though this is a discussion for another time.

In addition to the above point, there is also the very reasonable argument that regardless of metaphysical freedom, it is still preferrable for citizens to have a peaceful and participatory relationship with their government. I fail to see how, given the distinction between coercion and determination, this could be argued against.

(3) If our persons and our decisions are all determined, then it is pointless to attempt to change anything at all, including the behavior of others. Thus, we have no option but to despair if we adopt a deterministic outlook.

A variation on (1), this argument also fails to factor in the causal role our decisions play regardless of if they are determined or not. It also conflates, as (1) does, the fixity of the universe with the meaninglessness of attempting to alter the world around us. The way this argument is phrased makes it appear the author means that, regardless of if I choose A or B, the outcome will still be C, though I suspect what the author truly means is that regardless of what I do, I am destined to choose B and thus stuck with the outcome of C. With this knowledge, how can I help but be depressed?

Again, though, the author fails to account for the fact that, except in instances of coercion, even if our actions are determined they are still our actions. If I decide to purchase a turkey sandwich instead of a ham sandwich, just because I would not have purchases a ham sandwich unless the situation had somehow differed, why should I despair? The choice is still in accordance with my preferences, and I am not being made to act other than I wish to act – all the author seems to be concerned about is an unrealistic standard for agent-causal freedom that allows persons to remain unswayed by any factors and yet still make decisions and cause events. As may be clear from some of my previous posts, I disagree strongly with this ‘requirement’ for meaning.

(4) If moral responsibility requires that a decision be made under a person’s own power in order for her to be responsible for it, and determinism concludes that no choice she makes is ever up to her, then all talk of morality is pointless.

Here it might be convenient to quote the author in order to see what is going on:

Once Sam Harris denies that we are “answerable or accountable, as for something within one’s own power, control, or management,” which is a standard definition (e.g., dictionary.reference.com) for “responsibility,” then any talk of “morality” does become empty and hollow. Again, his view is that human actionsare determined by “neuronal weather.” So none of our actions or thoughts are under our control. Therefore, it still makes good sense to say that Sam Harris’s position means that all talk about morality is completely illusory.

First, it is slightly problematic to use the definition provided here, since it concerns power and control. I do not believe many determinists would deny that, at any given moment (unless we are being coerced or there are other mitigating factors), most persons are under control of their behavior in that most actions are in accordance with a thought process and are rationalized (even if only after the fact.) A better approach would be to use the Principle of Alternate Possibility, which states that I am only morally responsible for my actions if I could have done otherwise. This, of course, condemns determinism to a lack of moral responsibility since I can seemingly never do other than I could do. I am, of course, sympathetic to this approach, given that elsewhere I discuss how I do not believe Harry Frankfurt’s revised PAP quite does the job required of it. I am not sure of how I feel about moral responsibility versus moral judgement, though the article linked to in the last sentence gives an introduction to my thoughts about it thus far. So, other than the example, (4) is relatively innocuous.

(5) Sam Harris relegates moral responsibility to being capable of being held accountable for those actions in accordance with my desires, feelings, etc. But since none of these are under my control, how can I be held accountable for them? Also, this view seems to run contrary to the common view of responsibility, etc.

In this point, the author once again reiterates that if determinism is true, none of our thoughts or feelings are under our control, which I discuss above as not necessarily being the case. That being said, I would challenge anyone reading to consider how exactly they experience the onset of a thought, or remembering some event or fact. I think those who believe we control our every thought and desire will be surprised when they consider that, if I cannot remember a certain person’s name, I am incapable of remembering it until my brain accesses that portion of my memory. You cannot force yourself to remember someone’s name – it either comes to you instantly, or it comes to you later, or never. Similarly, I never choose to have the desire for pizza – I simply have  the desire to eat pizza and then choose to satiate it or not. This is an important distinction, because it points to what I believe is an antiquated view of persons as passengers in the body, capable of controlling nearly every element but somehow existing as something more than the physiological parts. This view is not in keeping with modern advances in neuroscience, nor is it a particularly easy  metaphysical approach to defend.

I mean no disrespect to the author of the post to which I am replying. However, I do think it exemplifies a number of misconceptions that ultimately contribute to an unfair rejection of determinism. While the author and others may yet still disagree with the points listed here, I hope that my responses can shed some light on the true nature of a deterministic worldview so that it may be properly considered.

**2/4/12: Updated the hyperlink above to reflect the new domain, www.reasonsforgod.org**

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  1. August 1, 2011 at 11:10 PM

    As someone who is still learning how to sift through the rhetoric in the commentaries about free will and determinism, I find this helpful. How familiar are you with Al Mele’s work on the topic? Have you read his Effective Intentions? (If so, I’d love to hear your thoughts).

    • August 6, 2011 at 3:45 PM

      Nick,

      I am glad you found the post helpful. To be honest, not very familiar. I will check out Effective Intentions (my list is long, though!)

  2. August 2, 2011 at 1:51 AM

    If you subscribe to something other than a consequentialist theory of ethics, then morality and determinism can easily go hand in hand. Libertarian ethics dictates that murder is categorically wrong, even if certain people are inextricably determined to commit murder.

  3. Aaron
    August 5, 2011 at 1:55 AM

    Jared,

    Allow me to push you a bit. You write ‘Similarly, I never choose to have the desire for pizza – I simply have the desire to eat pizza and then choose to satiate it or not.’

    But isn’t it the case that we often place ourselves in situations with the intention of developing future desires. E.g., if I commit myself to an expensive gym membership, though I do not now (actually, I do) desire to remain physically fit, I suspect there is a good chance that I will begin to develop the appropriate neurological brain states we might want to identify as desires and begin to want to remain fit.

    If this is so, though, is it then the case that I am free to desire to desire to remain physically fit even though I am not free to desire to remain physically fit?

    • August 6, 2011 at 4:12 PM

      Aaron,

      I appreciate the push!

      Let me know if it is an inappropriate parallel, but your counterexample sounds similar to Frankfurt’s first and second order desires. So, if the parallel is warranted, you are questioning whether I accept that persons can be capable of 2nd order desires (desires that concern other, first order, desires)? The short response would be that, while 2nd order desires appear to stem more strongly from personal psychological and physiological tendencies than, say, more general 1st order desires, they are nevertheless prompted by those same elements that are often claimed to be “outside of our control.” So, as is determinist writ at this point, while you may purchase a gym membership in an attempt to facilitate future desires to work out, your 2nd order desire regarding working out is prompted by perhaps a self-image of needing to be healthy that is heavily informed by past experiences, personal insecurity, vanity, or any other number of influential elements which could ultimately be traced back to determinative elements outside of your control, etc.

      All of this is to say that, I will tentatively grant that 2nd order desires are more particular to individuals than more general 1st order desires, though I do not believe they differ in any significant way with regard to a person’s ability to ‘freely’ will (in the agent causal sense) those desires to manifest. Hopefully this answers your question.

      Also, by way of pushing back a little, would you say that purchasing a gym membership is indicative of a hitherto ineffective first order desire? So, your second order desire to make the desire to be physically fit effective indicates that you have already experienced the first order desire to be physically fit, but it was ineffective (to use Frankfurt’s language)? What I mean to indicate is that the presence of a second order desire could imply the failure of a 1st order desire to become effective, meaning it is dependent upon 1st order desires and so less likely to originate “freely.” This would mean that you would not have had the 2nd order desire to purchase a gym membership had your initial 1st order desire to be physically fit been effective.

  4. Daniel Wattenberg
    April 9, 2012 at 4:39 PM

    Maybe I’m missing something, but the determinist argument as stated and defended here sounds like a tautology: “Our choices are inalterably determined by a neurological event from the very instant they are inalterably determined by a neurological event. What happens before that instant — that’s less clear.”

  5. April 21, 2012 at 1:42 PM

    Hi Daniel,

    Thank you for reading and taking the time to comment. I am not sure what portion of this particular post you are referencing with regard to your neurological causation example, but allow me to first reiterate a portion of the post above, one which succinctly states the determinism position that I advance:

    “So, when I say that my choice between apple pie and pumpkin pie is determined, what I mean to say is that whatever choice I end up making is the choice I was going to make, ceteris paribus. Had a detail of the universe prior to that moment been other than it was, my decision might have been different. This in no ways means that I do not feel as though I deliberate at the moment of decision, or that I cannot decide I want apple pie but change my mind when I get to the counter – all it means is that, by virtue of the very nature of causality, I cannot ever act in a manner other than how I would act if the state of the universe remained the same. Had the state of the universe been different, I might have decided differently, since the causal chain leading up to my decision was altered.”

    With this being said, the simple answer to your proposed tautology is that it is a mischaracterization of my argument and the determinist position. Given that, as far as I can see, I do not utilize such an example or a sentence in my post I am not sure where you see a tautology in my argument. This aside, I believe the quote I reference above should demonstrate that I do not just shrug my shoulders when the question of antecedent causal factors is raised. Rather, as should be clear from the post and many others on this blog, we arrive at our current state of affairs exactly because of the state of the universe prior to the present moment.

    If I have misunderstood your critique please feel free to correct me.

  6. December 12, 2012 at 6:05 AM

    Dear Jared:

    I have to concur with the prior comment as being a tautology. You said…

    So, when I say that my choice between apple pie and pumpkin pie is determined, what I mean to say is that whatever choice I end up making is the choice I was going to make, ceteris paribus.

    One has a decision to make. There are a myriad of overwhelmingly persuasive reasons to do A, and absolutely no rational or self-interested reason to do non-A. And there are strong emotive and psychological impulses to do A as well. However, in order to prove that I am not determined (whether by Calvinism’s ‘free agency’ or through the subjective conscious faculties and their neurochemical underpinnings), I consider to do non-A. There are absolutely no other reasons to do non-A than to prove my independence of will. Will I have broken the spell of that “irresistible grace” or irresistible neurochemically-induced psychological impulse?

    The problem is that if I did perform non-A, it can equally be suggested that my irrational decision was predicated on another and prevailing set of internal impulses or reasons. And thus whether I chose A or non-A, my decision can be construed as having been determined. I have no criteria to prove it otherwise. As you said “what I mean to say is that whatever choice I end up making is the choice I was going to make”. And thus as Karl Popper complained about the proponents ‘scientific’ socialism and ‘psychoanalysis’, determinism is not a falsifiable proposition. I found it to be unprovable dogma.

    Some other points. You said…

    “It can very easily be the case that I could not have done other than I have done, but that I am not being physically or emotionally coerced.”

    Even if there are external pressures borne upon a person, that really is not any different than any other neurological or social influence. One might resist the pressures and pay a steeper consequence. There is no justification to differentiate between external coercion and a will directly dictated by subjective consciousness (“qualia”) or the underlying neurochemical processes, which Harris speculates precede and cause the psychology based on spurious evidence.

    The type of human mind/will that you (“does not mean he cannot participate in the causal chains which might results in another person being persuaded by a certain argument”) and Harris have built is an algorithmic machine with mechanistic logic subroutines to govern every exigency. I know that this is the prevailing view put forth by philosophy of mind and neuroscience adherents.

    It is a highly laughable view, considering the radical inconsistency and semi-rationality of humanity; as any thoroughgoing study of history will attest. People don’t change their minds most of the time because of different inputs show them a better way. One could show a thousand proofs, including those of self-interest, and one’s interlocutor will not budge. Humanity is not easily programmable. (Those neuroscientific experiments which can get motor movements do not qualify if the person is not at all conscious of a decision to implement it. It is mere neuro equivalent of the tap on the funny bone.)

    Decades ago, I had to debug the spaghetti code of a whole application written by a contractor who must not have read the section on the use of subroutines. It was so impossible to undo that I had to throw it to one side. The nature of human minds is worse than that application. And yet human beings don’t seem to experience a blue screen of death or an infinite loop, for some reason. Besides, in the human mind, it is not only the data inputs that change. The very foundational logic alters in very volatile dynamic fashion. And it is not even the logic, but the equivalent of the reserved words and functions (i.e. if…else and do…while) that change their semantic meaning on the go. If the universe was fashioned with laws that changed as quick as the ‘logic’ of most people, it would have imploded long ago.

    Finally, an “onset of a thought or remembering some event or fact” is not an act of will; something that Benjamin Libet conceptually screwed up in his experiments. It is an input. It would be akin to conflating what comes through the ears with that which comes out the mouth.

    http://entsoltech.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/the-unfalsifiability-of-all-forms-of-determinism/

  7. December 12, 2012 at 1:49 PM

    Hi Johnny,

    Thanks for taking the time to read and comment on my blog! With regard to your two points, I think you may have misunderstood them in the context of my post.

    (1) The claim that “whatever choice I make is the choice I would have made” is tautologous.

    It seems that you, and perhaps Daniel, misunderstand my use of the pie example. The point, and the reason I phrased it as I did, is to illustrate that (absent coercion) the decisions we make are generally in line with our desires, and that however we change our mind (A or not-A) such a change will be, in some way or another, based upon a desire or impulse that we have. This seems like a fairly innocuous claim, since I don’t see why libertarians, determinists, or compatibilists would have any reason to disagree that our actions are generally in keeping with our desire to act in some way. Further, what I was attempting to draw out is that determinism is not quite as offensive to our sensibilities as it is usually presented, since the proximate antecedent conditions that lead me to act are in fact grounded in those aspects we traditionally associate with who I am as a person, including my desires, goals, inclinations, tastes, preferences, etc. My inability to choose these aspects of myself may result in feeling as though they are arbitrary, but absent unfounded claims about atomic identity (souls, etc.) I am not sure how else we would begin to consider ourselves as individuals if not predicated, at least in part, on these aspects. It is in this sense, then, that the choices I make are the choices that I would have made precisely because their antecedents constitute the conception of myself that I have.

    I won’t argue that determinism is not a closed system – you are quite right that both A and not-A would be considered determined choices. What you gloss over, though, is that if choosing not-A is merely to attempt to go against all of your desires in order to falsify determinism, you still have the desire to act against those other desires, and that is consistent with your identity in some deep way. Nowhere in my post do I attempt to argue that determinism is (1) the only true and consistent position to hold or (2) falsifiable in any way. On those grounds, I’m not quite sure what else to say on this point. The post was not a defense of determinism as a falsifiable theory, but rather intended to clear up some very basic misconceptions about the implications of accepting (or even considering) a deterministic worldview.

    (2) There is no real difference between coercion and deterministic antecedents.

    As you may or may not know, this is a very important distinction in compatibilist theories. The difference between a deterministic antecedent and an external coercive element is that some compatibilist theories purport that the former can nevertheless be in line with our desires, goals, etc. and it is on these grounds that we can be considered free, while the latter impinges upon those desires, goals. Not all external considerations are coercive, and I’ll leave that discussion of what the threshold for coercion is for another day/conversation/blogger.

    (3) Harris and I have an unrealistic/confused view of human nature that assumes perfect rationality (at least this is what I read this part of your comments to mean).

    I am a bit puzzled by this, since the passage from my post you quote (“does not mean he cannot participate in the causal chains which might results in another person being persuaded by a certain argument”) is in reference to the obviously false claim that events in a deterministic universe cannot play a causal role in other events and so determinism means no one can ever be persuaded of anything (mutatis mutandis, that the actions of one individual cannot ever impact another). It does not refer to anything like a claim that humans are logic-bots who act based on some logical input or formula they are given. Further, this quote is in reference to a highly simplified view of a deterministic universe, not to the reasoning process of human beings. As should be apparent, humans can (and frequently are) persuaded or not persuaded by rational and irrational arguments, ideas, emotions, etc. This does not mean that these are not determinative, though.

    (4) Memories and thoughts are not acts of will, so this analogy fails.

    Perhaps the act of remembering and the arising of thoughts are not acts of will, but if these are what our acts of will are predicated on then a transitive view of causality seems to indicate that this argument holds.

    Additionally, current fMRI studies that build upon the spirit of Libet’s work demonstrate that determinative antecedent brain activity is unconscious, such that the activity is not even akin to memory or the appearance of thoughts.

    Again, thanks for reading! Let me know if I’ve misunderstood your comments.

    All the best,
    Jared

    • December 12, 2012 at 11:57 PM

      Jared: I have recently revisited most of Libet’s papers, so the following caught my attention.

      “…current fMRI studies that build upon the spirit of Libet’s work demonstrate that determinative antecedent brain activity is unconscious”

      The only recent stuff of which I am aware was by Hakwan Lau and his team. I wonder if you could pass along the references to the studies you had in mind. Peace!

      • December 13, 2012 at 12:16 AM

        Hey Nick,

        You are probably far more up on this literature than I, but the study I was referring to is:

        Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, Nature Neuroscience 11, no. 5 (May 2008)

        Another great source, although not a fresh study itself, is:

        Sean A. Spence, The Actors Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Neuroscience of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

        If I am incorrect, please let me know!

        Best, Jared

  8. December 13, 2012 at 6:19 AM

    Jared:

    A couple of notes:

    (1) What you gloss over, though, is that if choosing not-A is merely to attempt to go against all of your desires in order to falsify determinism, you still have the desire to act against those other desires, and that is consistent with your identity in some deep way.

    Quite the contrary, I did not intend to suggest that. I am aware that if I chose not-A, it could be argued that the motives for non-A were stronger at that point in time; as irrational and contrary to self-interest. However, this just demonstrates that the thesis creates an intrinsically perfect circularity; therefore semantically futile.

    Determinism, whether the Sam Harris kind or Calvinism, to which, except for the foundational source, is an exact analogous replica, will be found abhorrent by the public at large. What you are calling determinism is in Calvinist circles called “free agency” to differentiate it from “free will”. Although ruminations on determinism can go back as far 5th and 5th Century Ionian Physiologists, the best of historical Calvinism is light years ahead of a scientific replica in terms of understanding the inner logic and conundrums posed by this thesis. The distaste for it (or at least the kind that is usually presented, which is similar to the secular rendition that Harris speaks) is not because of divinity. It has always been because of the detestation of being thought of as a robot. For this reason, materialist philosophy of mind thinkers and neuroscientists/psychiatrists tend to for political reasons shy away from publicly airing their views.

    The problem as I said is that “free agency” is an epistemological circularity.

    (2) I would take exception to that standard understanding, I agree. It is a formula for anti-heroism.

    (3) I am not suggesting a perfect rationality in the common sense; but a perfect algorithmism, which includes the complexity of all manner of inputs other than pure rational. The problem is that unlike an interrupt (computer jargon), in which there is a subroutine to necessarily logically handle the incoming input, the human can quite frankly ignore it. And in my experience, one can find an interlocutor to seek every means, fair and foul, to avoid then and later an overwhelmingly convincing argument and its implications, if they do not wish to adopt it. The point is not that people are not rational. It is that you imply that they are still necessarily reasonable.

    (4) Benjamin Libet’s experiments

    I have read a number of experiments since (including Soon’s) that follow along the same lines as Libet (in reference to other comments). There are some methodological improvements. However, they all betray, if one does an exegesis on the implied understandings within their methodologies, an understanding that the input thought is the act of will to which the research subjects are responding to. It is for that reason Libet calls the defying of the input thought a “free won’t”. (Man has no free will but he has free won’t. He arrives at that because of his conceptual misunderstanding of free will.)

    The whole point of the theme and variations of Libet’s experiments is to prove empirically an actual temporal precedence of neuronal activity before actual conscious will (and consequent conscious journalistic self-awareness of that conscious will). The problem is that in his experiment, he is dealing with not only scientific (physical) issues but a philosophical conception and definition. And Libet has that philosophical definition wrong.

    If an incoming thought was an act of free will (conceptually), then a man would be morally culpable for everything that registers into his consciousness. This would constitute an absurd understanding in legal history of culpability as something upon which one has control over. (It explains some of the disingenuous sophistries about legal culpability by Harris). It would be akin to being to blame for the happenchance witnessing of a mugging, rather than being a full participant.

    Your argument about the “transitive view of causality” remains just an assertion, without that empirical evidence that Libet and company seek because the experiments are not necessarily measuring the act of will but the input thought. There are so many assumptions and leaps of conclusions being made in Libet’s experiment. However, this is a long project and an essay I haven’t yet fully updated and edited.

    It is not wise to cite fMRIs by the way (this is relation to your other contributors’ comments). As useful as fMRIs are, for experiments requiring temporal precision, they are highly unreliable. There is, at least last time I checked 2 or 3 years ago, no industry-standard way of interpreting them. In the I.T. business, we would scorn such lack of consistency which leads to capricious and inventive understanding of the data. However, more importantly, fMRIs are proxies of neuronal activity. They measure blood flow or presence in a brain area in consequence of neuronal activity. That blood flow does not flow at a consistent mechanistic rate. Therefore, for precision temporal experiments, I would rely on ECGs more.

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